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Abstract 
Classically, vagueness has been regarded as something bad. It leads to the Sorites paradox, 
borderline cases, and the (apparent) violation of the logical principle of bivalence. Never-
theless, there have always been people claiming that vagueness is also valuable. Many 
have pointed out that we could not communicate as successfully or efficiently as we do if 
we would not use vague language. Indeed, we often use vague terms when we could have 
used more precise ones instead. Many people (implicitly or explicitly) assume that we do 
so because their vagueness has a positive function. But how and in what sense can vague-
ness be said to have a value? This paper is an attempt to give an answer to this question. It 
examines seven arguments that can be reconstructed from the literature. The (negative) 
result of this examination is, however, that there is not much reason to believe that vague-
ness has a positive function at all, since none of the arguments is (even remotely) conclu-
sive. 
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1 Introduction 
Almost since the beginning of the philosophical debate on vagueness, most people have 
seen it as a problem. It leads to the Sorites paradox, borderline cases, and the (apparent) 
violation of the logical principle of bivalence. In jurisprudence, for instance, it has widely 
been regarded as a threat to the rule of law. 
Most theories of vagueness give up on certain logical principles in order to accommodate 
the vagueness of natural language in an effort to save logic from paradox and incon-
sistency. And, even from a layperson’s perspective, it is doubtful what function vagueness 
could possibly have in everyday communication. After all, clarity is an important goal to 
both speakers and listeners in most conversations. There is prima facie reason to treat 
vagueness as a problem. 
Nevertheless, there have also been surprisingly many people claiming that vagueness is 
valuable. Among them are Max Black, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Friedrich Waismann and, 
more recently, Rohit Parikh, Manfred Pinkal, Nora Kluck, Manfred Krifka and Kees van 
Deemter. They (explicitly or implicitly) assume that in many cases we use vague terms 
when we could have used more precise ones instead because their vagueness itself has a 
positive function.1 Unfortunately, the arguments in favor of this assumption are rarely 
                                                        
1 A term is precise iff it is not vague. 
What is the Value of Vagueness? 
 
2 
made explicit. In this paper I will discuss seven arguments that can be reconstructed from 
the literature in favor of this view.2 
2 Setting the Stage 
Two general remarks are in order before we can dive into the discussion of the arguments. 
First, let us get clear about what vagueness is. A proper grasp of the concept will allow us 
to differentiate it from other – related – phenomena. Second, let us get clear about what it 
means to say that vagueness is valuable, has a positive function, or is useful.3 Both clarifi-
cations are, I take it, necessary to precisely state and properly evaluate the arguments. 
2.1 What is Vagueness? 
Vagueness is usually explained by reference to paradigmatically vague terms such as 
“blue”, “tall” or “heap.” Moreover, three characteristics have been accepted in the litera-
ture as essential to vagueness. According to Rosanna Keefe (2000, pp. 6–7), vague expres-
sions are commonly understood to (1) admit borderline cases, (2) be susceptible to the So-
rites paradox, and (3) (apparently) lack sharp boundaries. These three criteria are, how-
ever, rarely accepted as individually necessary and collectively sufficient conditions for 
vagueness. Sometimes, they are treated simply as symptoms or signs of vagueness. 
Consequently, there is no commonly accepted definition of vagueness. An influential way 
to understand vagueness has been put forward by H. Paul Grice, however: 
To say that an expression is vague [...] is [...] to say that there are cases (actual or 
possible) in which one does not know whether to apply the expression or to withhold 
it, and one’s not knowing is not due to ignorance of the facts. (Grice, 1989, p. 177) 
Cases in which an expression does neither clearly apply nor clearly not apply, while the 
reason for this unclarity is not ignorance of the facts, are commonly called “borderline 
cases.” Higher-order unclarity about borderline cases is generally seen as the source of 
Sorites susceptibility. That is, vague terms are susceptible to the Sorites paradox because 
they do not (appear to) demarcate a (sharp) boundary between those cases in which an ex-
pression does clearly apply and those cases in which it does not clearly apply. There are 
borderline cases of borderline cases as well as borderline cases of borderline cases of bor-
derline cases, and so forth. 
Due to this property of vague terms, they give rise to the Sorites paradox: 
(1) 1,000,000 grains of sand is a heap of sand. 
(2) A heap of sand minus one grain is still a heap. 
(3) Thus: One grain of sand is a heap. 
                                                        
2 Strikingly, there is no real debate about the value of vagueness – apart from some contributions to this question 
in the philosophy of law (e.g. Sorensen 2001, Endicott 2005, Asgeirsson 2015, Lanius 2019 and Asgeirsson 2020) 
and game theory (e.g. Jaegher 2003 and Jaegher and Rooij 2010). 
3 Please note that I will use the phrases “is valuable”, “has a positive function”, and “is useful” interchangeably 
and non-technically in this paper. 
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The premise (2) captures what has been coined the tolerance (by Crispin Wright) or bound-
arylessness (by Mark Sainsbury) of vague terms. In the now famous words of Wright 
(1976/1997, p. 156), "[w]hat is involved [...] is a certain tolerance [...], a notion of a degree 
of change too small to make any difference, as it were." As Sainsbury (1997, p. 257) de-
scribes it, a vague term is boundaryless 
in that no boundary marks the things which fall under it from the things which do 
not, and no boundary marks the things which definitely fall under it from the things 
which do not definitely do so; and so on. Manifestations are the unwillingness of 
knowing subjects to draw any such boundaries, the cognitive impossibility of identi-
fying such boundaries, and the needlessness and even disutility of such boundaries. 
Part of what “heap” means is that the addition or subtraction of a single grain cannot make 
a difference to whether some arrangement of grains constitute a heap. If someone denies 
this, we have reason to think that they do not understand the meaning of “heap.” That is, 
vague terms are tolerant to small changes (or, in other words, they are boundaryless).4 
While it is controversial what properties are essential to vagueness, we could surely say 
that vagueness has a positive function if at least one of the three characteristics has a pos-
itive function. If it can be shown that being susceptible to the Sorites paradox, lacking 
sharp boundaries, or admitting borderline cases has positive effects, then we can also jus-
tifiably say that vagueness has a value. Maybe vagueness has a value only if all three prop-
erties are combined or due to some other property of vague terms that is (more fundamen-
tally) connected to vagueness. We will look at this possibility when examining the argu-
ments in due course. What is certain, however, is that it is not enough to show only that 
sometimes we prefer vague terms when we could have used more precise ones instead; we 
need to show that we do so because of their vagueness (however understood). 
2.2 Value, Function, Utility 
But what can it mean that vagueness has a positive value, function, or use? People who have 
claimed that vagueness has a value have rarely explicated what having a value means or 
even in what sense vagueness might possibly have a value. 
Clearly, when asking what value vagueness might have we are concerned with instrumen-
tal value.5 The instrumental value of something is the value that it has in virtue of the fact 
that it is a means to something desirable. Desirability can be understood very broadly as 
anything that is desired by someone. If Mary desires to manipulate her audience into be-
lieving that she is a goddess, then whatever is a means to fulfilling that desire has instru-
                                                        
4 Sainsbury already suggests that boundarylessness itself be a feature – something that has utility, in contrast to 
“the disutility of boundaries.” However, like so many others, he does not offer an explanation of how boundary-
lessness might be useful or an argument why this be the case. 
5 No one in the literature appears to have claimed that vagueness has intrinsic value – which would be a pretty 
wild claim to begin with. 
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mental value to her. Usually, desirability is understood somewhat narrower: more norma-
tively. Something has instrumental value only if it is a means to the common good, to some 
rational goal or to something that is objectively desirable.6 
We have an intuitively clear grasp on what it would mean for tools such as pens to be in-
strumentally valuable. A pen has instrumental value if it helps us to accomplish tasks such 
as writing or drawing. We desire to write a letter and the pen is a suitable means to that 
end. This is due to some properties such as, e.g., its handiness or having a functioning ball-
point, but not due to others such as, e.g., its having a certain color. 
A pen might even be valuable as a hair clip or a tool for scratching. Again, this is arguably 
more due to its handiness and less due to its color. It is indispensable that the pen has some 
color, but this does not make the color a means to the end of pinning up one’s hair. In con-
trast, a pen can have aesthetic value, too. With regard to this end, its color may very well 
be the property that is functional to further it. Its color may help to accomplish that we feel 
pleased when looking at the pen. 
How are things when examining the potential value of vagueness? How can borderline 
cases, Sorites susceptibility or the lack of boundaries be useful? What might these proper-
ties help to accomplish? 
Please note that it does not suffice to have an explanation for why there is vagueness in our 
language. Of course, we also want to know why we speak vague languages. But giving such 
an explanation is not the same as providing reasons for the claim that vagueness has a 
value. Equating this presupposes an impoverished (and fairly uninteresting) concept of 
value. We would not say that something is valuable if it is an unavoidable side-effect of 
something that has a value. Something has a value if it helps us to achieve something. 
This is why it is paramount to differentiate between vagueness and other properties of 
vague terms. As Roy Sorensen points out: 
“Vague” has a sense which is synonymous with abnormal generality. This precipi-
tates many equivocal explanations of vagueness. For instance, many commentators 
say that vagueness exists because broad categories ease the task of classification. If I 
can describe your sweater as red, then I do not need to ascertain whether it is scarlet. 
This freedom to use wide intervals obviously helps us to learn, teach, communicate, 
and remember. But so what? (Sorensen, 1997) 
If we want to know whether vagueness is valuable, we need to ascertain that it is not some-
thing else that helps us to achieve the goal in question; that vagueness is not simply a by-
product of successful communication, but that it contributes to its success; that we have 
not mistaken the vagueness of the vague term “red” (that it allows for borderline cases, is 
susceptible to the Sorites paradox, and that it lacks boundaries) with its generality (that it 
can be equally applied to many things). 
                                                        
6 Most scholars who argue for the value of vagueness, arguably, have such narrower concepts of value. What hap-
pens when we broaden our concept of value, will be discussed in section 5. 
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Of course, there are also people who claim that some linguistic property that they call 
“vagueness” has value. In most cases, it becomes immediately clear that these people do 
not mean vagueness in the sense captured by Keefe’s three characteristics when they argue 
for the “value of vagueness” – but some other property of (contingently) vague expres-
sions (such as their generality or ambiguity).7 Other people, however, list paradigmatic ex-
amples of vague terms, use Keefe’s three characteristics of vagueness, and cite the philo-
sophical literature on the Sorites paradox and borderline cases. These people claim that 
vagueness in the philosophical sense has a positive function. In what follows I will examine 
arguments for this claim only. 
3 Nine Arguments for the Value of Vagueness 
As a matter of fact, we often use language in ways less determinate than possible. In par-
ticular, we often use vague terms when we could have used more precise ones instead. Why 
do we so often voluntarily opt for vague terms? Do we and should we do so because of their 
vagueness – or do other forms of indeterminacy (such as ambiguity, generality, indeter-
minacy in implicatures, etc.) or even entirely different features of these terms have positive 
functions only? What does the vagueness of vague terms do (independently from their 
other properties)? 
We are looking for arguments that have approximately this structure: 
(1) X is desirable. 
(2) Vagueness is a suitable (or indispensable) causal means to bring about X. 
(3) If vagueness is a suitable (or indispensable) causal means to bring about something 
desirable, then vagueness has instrumental value. 
(4) Thus: Vagueness has instrumental value. 
When do we use the vagueness of vague terms? To show that using vague language is a 
suitable means to some desirable end is clearly not sufficient to show that its vagueness 
has instrumental value. If we can show that being susceptible to the Sorites paradox, lack-
ing sharp boundaries, admitting borderline cases, or a combination thereof is a suitable 
means to some desirable end, however, we can be certain that vagueness has instrumental 
value. Let us now examine the nine most promising arguments for the value of vagueness 
that can be reconstructed from the literature. 
3.1 The Argument from Communicative Success 
Some philosophers have argued that vagueness does not preclude successful communica-
tion and thus cannot be problematic.8 They reject the Fregean ideal of a perfect, precise, 
and unambiguous language. As Wright (1975, p. 325) puts it, “we have long since aban-
doned the Frege-Russell view of the matter. We no longer see the vagueness of ordinary 
                                                        
7 Most economic literature on the “value of vagueness” actually deals with the value of generality. For instance, 
Hadfield (1994), Staton and Vanberg (2008), or Choi and Triantis (2010) 
8 Historically, this argument has been advanced in some form or another by, e.g., Black (1937), Hempel (1939), 
Wittgenstein (1953/2009), Peirce (1960), or Quine (1960).  
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language as a defect.” Indeed, there are hardly any philosophers who defend this ideal an-
ymore. Most linguists and philosophers of language today explicitly hold the view that or-
dinary language is fine as it is. It is close to uncontroversial that vagueness is not neces-
sarily a problem. But what does this tell us about its value? 
The most famous version of the Argument from Communicative Success might be attributed 
to Rohit Parikh. Parikh game-theoretically shows that even if borderline cases actually 
arise and unclarity results, as long as the conversational purpose is not (seriously) ob-
structed, vague messages can be useful. According to his interpretation of vagueness, 
vague terms have an extension which is slightly different for different language users such 
that there is disagreement between them in some cases (sc. borderline cases). Based on this 
understanding of vagueness, he shows that vague messages can succeed in promoting the 
conversation’s goal – even under perfect alignment of interests. 
Consider the following situation: Ann wants Bob to bring her the topology book from the 
library. She only tells him that it is blue. Due to its vagueness, the phrase “blue books” does 
not have a single extension, but is divided into blueA books (within Ann's semantic) and 
blueB books (within Bob's semantic); the extensions of the homonymous terms “blueA 
books” and “blueB books” merely overlap. As long they do so sufficiently ( i.e., if there are 
not too many borderline cases), Bob obtains sufficiently useful information to efficiently 
find the correct book and bring it to Ann. If Bob searches all blueB books first and then the 
others (the less and less blue ones from his perspective), he will find the correct book with 
higher probability more quickly than if he has to search all books more or less randomly. 
Bob will thus save time by searching all blueB books, even though this is not (strictly speak-
ing) what Ann intended. 
Parikh’s representation captures an important aspect of vagueness. What is problematic 
about it, however, is that language users usually do not unconsciously have idiosyncratic 
idioms which they assume to be precise. It is possible for language users to explicitly dis-
agree in borderline cases on whether the term correctly applies or to explicitly agree that 
they face a borderline case in which they should suspend their judgment about the term’s 
application. Vagueness does not (merely) consist in incompletely overlapping extensions 
between idiolects. But if we accept that this captures at least an important aspect of vague-
ness (and I think that we should), we can conclude with Parikh that this property of vague 
terms is useful inasmuch as it does not preclude successful communication. 
Do we also have an appropriate argument to show that vagueness has a value? Parikh's 
argument establishes the claim that borderline cases do not preclude successful commu-
nication. It does not establish, however, the claim that borderline cases are a suitable 
causal means to bring about successful communication. Parikh convincingly shows that 
communication in vague terms can be valuable in the sense that it is better than no com-
munication at all. However, it is also clearly the case that Ann and Bob would communicate 
even better if the extensions of “blueA books” and “blueB books” would overlap entirely, 
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i.e., if the terms used were precise.9 Parikh presupposes that vagueness is a necessary fea-
ture of natural language, which it arguably is, and, based on this presupposition, argues 
that natural language can be used to successfully exchange information despite its vague-
ness. Parikh cannot – and does not even try to – explain why vagueness is valuable in a 
more interesting sense. Unless we are willing to say that something is valuable if it does 
not preclude something valuable, we cannot draw the conclusion that vagueness is valua-
ble. 
Consider the following passage from Wittgenstein. He asks us to take into account the con-
versation's purpose and shake off any ill-advised longings for the ideal of exactness: 
Now, if I tell someone: “You should come to dinner more punctually; you know it be-
gins at one o'clock exactly” – is there really no question of exactness here? After all, 
one can say: “Think of the determination of time in the laboratory or the observatory; 
there you see what ‘exactness’ means” “Inexact” is really a reproach, and “exact” is 
praise. And that is to say that what is inexact attains its goal less perfectly than does 
what is more exact. So it all depends on what we call “the goal”. Is it inexact when I 
don't give our distance from the sun to the nearest metre, or tell a joiner the width of 
a table to the nearest thousandth of a millimetre? No single ideal of exactness has 
been envisaged [...]. (Wittgenstein, 1953/2009, p. 88) 
Wittgenstein's point is that the goal of perfect precision is not a generally reasonable one. 
There is no sense in which someone is completely punctual. But also for most other scales 
there is usually a certain point from which onward precise measurement becomes increas-
ingly difficult or outright impossible, such as the measurement of position and momentum 
of particles due Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. As a consequence, it is futile to strive 
for absolute precision in many cases.10 
As Charles Peirce is supposed to have said, "vagueness is no more to be done away with in 
the world of logic than friction in mechanics.”11 Accordingly, the purpose of most conver-
sations can be furthered by using vague terms. Conversations demand different “ideals of 
exactness” depending on their purpose. What counts as perfectly precise in one conversa-
tion, is unacceptably vague in another. 
Just as with Parikh’s claim about communicating successfully with vague language, there 
is nothing to say against this claim. It is as convincing as modest. Communication would 
obviously be hindered by always telling the time exactly to the nanosecond. Doing it would 
achieve nothing. Indeed, it would violate the conversational Maxims of Quantity and Rela-
tion to always telling the time exactly to the nanosecond or to describe the blueness of a 
book in terms of its wavelength. Even though a message informing about the exact time 
would be more precise, it would also be more informative than required and, as a result, 
                                                        
9 This has also been shown formally. See Lipman (2009) 
10 This is in part due to the imperfection of measurement. At least for continuous scales like time one can add 
always another decimal place – exacting ever more precise measurement. See also Swinburne (1969, p. 288) 
11 Cited in McNeill and Freiberger (1993, p. 136) 
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less relevant for the purposes of the conversation. There are some contexts in which the 
highest possible precision is pursued, as in science or logic. But the standard of precision 
is adjustable. It depends on the object and purpose of the conversation. As such, in virtually 
all contexts of ordinary conversation it is significantly lower. More importantly, the fact 
that we usually do not – and should not - tell the time to the nanosecond or describe colors 
by their wavelength spectrum does not entail that there is value in the vagueness of vague 
language. 
3.2 The Argument from Stability in Judgment 
Some have seen in an argument by Manfred Pinkal (1995) evidence for the claim that 
vagueness is valuable. He argues that a coarse-grained degree of granularity can facilitate 
stability in judgment. Perhaps this means that also vagueness (due to the fuzziness in the 
terms’ extension and the lack of (sharp) boundaries) can facilitate stability in judgment. 
Let us have a look at his argument and the concept of granularity! 
Granularity is the concept of breaking down a description into smaller parts (or granules). 
A coarse-grained description contains only a few parts and is thus less informative than a 
more fine-grained one. For instance, one can describe someone by saying that she is a per-
son (coarse-grained description) or by saying that she is a self-confident, 190cm tall, and 
brown-haired Polish citizen (more fine-grained description). Most parts in the descrip-
tions can be decomposed further into finer levels of granularity; for example, that the per-
son’s hair is long, thick and parted on the left. 
Now, if we were to describe someone by her precise height measured to the tenth decimal 
place, the description would need to be adjusted on a regular basis. The same is true if we 
describe her by the number of hairs on her head. Otherwise, it would not fit the subject who 
is slightly changing in height and number of hairs every day. Since we cannot simply per-
ceive the height of a person or the number of hairs exactly how they are, it is better to be 
less precise. 
Consider the following two utterances: 
(E1) “Anna is tall.” 
(E2) “Anna has a height of 190cm.” 
The utterance in (E1) is vague. However, if used as an answer to the question of how tall 
Anna is, the utterance in (E2) normally does not convey something precise either, but ra-
ther that Anna has a height of 190cm plus or minus a few nanometers or millimeters. If the 
degree of granularity is sufficiently coarse-grained, (E2) could even communicate that 
Anna has a height of 190cm plus or minus a few centimeters. Strikingly, the expressions 
used in (E2) are perfectly precise. What is vague is the implicit content.12 This is what has 
                                                        
12 I use the notion of implicit content as Bach (1994) introduced it.  
What is the Value of Vagueness? 
 
9 
been called pragmatic vagueness.13 Thus, it is better to utter the vague utterance in (E1) or 
at least the pragmatically vague one in (E2) instead of the precise utterance in 
(E3) “Anna has a height of 191.02cm.” 
For pragmatic reasons, a more coarse-grained degree of granularity is typically not possi-
ble for (E3). The judgments expressed by (E1) and (E2) are more stable because they are not 
susceptible to such small changes. It seems that vagueness facilitates this stability in judg-
ment.14 
We can now try to explicate the Argument from Stability in Judgment: 
(1) Stability in judgement is desirable. 
(2) The lack of (sharp) boundaries is a suitable means to achieve stability in judgement. 
(3) If the lack of (sharp) boundaries is a suitable causal means to bring about some-
thing desirable, then vagueness has instrumental value. 
(4) Thus: Vagueness has instrumental value. 
At first glance, this looks like a promising candidate of an argument to establish the value 
of vagueness. Unfortunately, however, a coarse-grained degree of granularity is not iden-
tical to a lack of (sharp) boundaries. Stability is primarily facilitated by the generality of the 
expressions used. As a consequence, the utterance is true in more (possible) states of af-
fairs. The utterances in (E1), (E2), and (E3) will all be accepted as true (or appropriate) if 
Anna has a height of 191.02cm. The utterances in (E1) and (E2) will, however, also be ac-
cepted as true (or appropriate) if Anna has a height of 190.98cm. In contrast, if the speaker 
utters (E3), she can be reasonably criticized if Anna's height differs even by a millimeter 
from 191.02cm. The lack of (sharp) boundaries is not what makes such less than fully pre-
cise utterances useful. It is their generality. Thus, Pinkal does not establish anything about 
the value of vagueness when he argues that sometimes a more coarse-grained degree of 
granularity is useful. He establishes that generality can be valuable. 
3.3 The Argument from Perception 
It has also been argued that vagueness is useful because it adequately represents our per-
ceptual experience.15 The unclarity caused by vagueness is, so the argument goes, a per-
fectly accurate reflection of the vague language's object. Friedrich Waismann (1965, p. 210) 
illustrates this claim with the example of rain: 
The picture of the rain I see is blurred. [...] I could not say of any exact description – 
e.g. for a description mentioning an exact number of raindrops – that it describes my 
experience exactly. 
Waismann’s argument can be reconstructed as the Argument from Perception in the follow-
ing way: 
                                                        
13 See, e.g., Endicott (2000, pp. 50–53) 
14 For instance, Jaegher and Rooij (2010) or Kluck (2014) explicitly claim this. 
15 See, for example, Russell (1923), Wittgenstein (1953/2009), or Waismann (1965) for this claim. 
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(1) It is desirable to adequately represent our perception. 
(2) Our perception is blurred. 
(3) Vagueness is a suitable (or maybe even indispensable) causal means to adequately 
represent blurred perception. 
(4) If vagueness is a suitable (or maybe even indispensable) causal means to bring 
about something desirable, then vagueness has instrumental value. 
(5) Thus: Vagueness has instrumental value. 
Due to our blurred perception of the world a vague language is more useful than a precise 
one because the former corresponds to our experience, while the latter simply misses the 
point. 
Wittgenstein makes a similar argument: 
“The moment we try to apply exact concepts of measurement to immediate experi-
ence, we come up against a peculiar vagueness in this experience. But that only 
means a vagueness relative to these concepts of measurement. And, now, it seems to 
me that this vagueness isn’t something provisional, to be eliminated later on by more 
precise knowledge, but that this is a characteristic logical peculiarity. If, e.g., I say: ‘I 
can now see a red circle on a blue ground and remember seeing one a few minutes 
ago that was the same size or perhaps a little smaller and a little lighter,’ then this 
experience cannot be described more precisely.” (Phil. Remarks, p. 263) 
But the argument continues: 
“Admittedly the words ‘rough’, ‘approximate’ etc. have only a relative sense, but they 
are still needed and they characterise the nature of our experience; not as rough or 
vague in itself, but still as rough and vague in relation to our techniques of represen-
tation. This is all connected with the problem ‘How many grains of sand make a 
heap?’” (ibid.) 
Bones (2020, p. 7) thinks that “what Wittgenstein is getting at […] is that compared to more 
sophisticated means of measurement and representation – such as, for example, spectro-
scopic analysis – the nature of our experience is rough, and this roughness is reflected in 
the vagueness or 'fuzziness' of the expressions of ordinary language.” 
However, it is worthwhile to look closer at what is going on when we use vague language 
to describe our “fuzzy” or “blurred” experiences. We may have a blurred picture of the rain 
(or of a red circle) and there is certainly not a number of rain drops that we directly per-
ceive. However, even if we grant for the sake of the argument that there is no more exact 
description of our experience (which I doubt), the fuzziness involved is not the right kind 
of fuzziness that relates to vagueness in the philosophical sense. There may be unclarity 
about the number of rain drops, about their size, and about other aspects of the weather 
conditions, but what we see is clearly rain. 
There seems to be an ambiguity and confusion about the term “fuzziness”. Vagueness 
concerns fuzziness in the extension of the term “rain”; it does not concern the fuzziness 
Waismann and Wittgenstein talk about. The phenomenon that we perceive may more or 
less clearly qualify as rain, but this does not depend on any fuzziness in our perception. It 
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depends on the fuzziness in the term’s extension – on there being borderline cases and 
maybe on the boundarylessness and Sorites susceptibility of the term. Evidently, border-
line cases, boundarylessness and Sorites susceptibility can be there when perception is ra-
ther exact; we can count the number of sand grains and we may even know everything there 
is to know about a particular arrangement of grains and it might still turn out to be a bor-
derline case of “heap”. Conversely, our perception can be blurred, while at the same time 
the term clearly applies to the phenomenon experienced – something that quite generally 
is the case when we use terms such as “rain” to talk about what the rainfall that we per-
ceive. 
3.4 The Argument from Memory 
Perhaps we adequately represent our perceptual experience due to the generality and 
broadness – and not the lack of (sharp) boundaries – of language. But our cognitive limi-
tations with respect to memory do seem to require the use of vague language: vagueness is 
useful because it suits the way we store and retrieve information – it suits the way our 
memory works.16 Consider the following scenario by Kees van Deemter (2010, p. 263): 
Suppose I told you that 324,542 people perished in some cataclysmic earthquake. For 
a while, you might remember the exact death toll. In the longer term, however, de-
tails are likely to be corrupted (if you remember the wrong number) or lost: the next 
day, you may only recall that the victims numbered in their hundreds of thousands; a 
year later, you may only remember that there were many. 
Van Deemter concludes that human memory retains only the gist of information due to 
evolutionary economization of memory space. At first glance, this really seems like a 
promising argument to establish the value of vagueness.  And, indeed, something seems to 
draw (most of) us to vague terms such as "many" when our memory is fading. What is it 
about “many” that we tend to prefer it to other comparatively easily truth-assessable but 
perfectly precise expressions? 
It seems that two cognitive mechanisms described by Alan Baddeley (2007) support van 
Deemter's conclusion. First, there is semantic coding by which only the meaning of an 
expression is retained, while the expression itself is forgotten. Second, there is chunking by 
which a handful of items are clustered together as a unit. Chunking is clearly connected to 
generality. We lump together specific information into general “chunks.” This is perhaps 
what is also going on in the case of perception. If details are corrupted or lost, one can 
choose a more general expression instead of a more specific one. Even if you cannot re-
member whether there are hundreds or merely tens of thousands people, you are usually 
still able to say whether there are more than 1,000 (or more than 10,000, etc.). 
Semantic coding, however, could be the source of vagueness. Maybe we really think 
“vaguely.” Maybe, it is easier for our memory to retain a fuzzy image than a clear-cut one. 
                                                        
16 See Waismann (1953/1978), van Deemter (2010), Kluck (2010), or Kluck (2014) for this claim. 
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Let us assume for the sake of the argument that this is the case. Then we can explicate the 
Argument from Memory: 
(1) It is desirable to effectively memorize and remember information. 
(2) Semantic coding is a suitable causal means to effectively memorize and remember 
information. 
(3) Vagueness is a necessary consequence of semantic coding. 
(4) If vagueness is a necessary consequence of some suitable causal means to some-
thing desirable, then vagueness has instrumental value. 
(5) Thus: Vagueness has instrumental value. 
Maybe our brains are such that we cannot but think and speak vaguely. Maybe vagueness 
is a necessary feature of human thought and language. If one does not have sufficient in-
formation and wants to be truthful, one must be less precise than generally desirable. But 
the reason is not that the lack of (sharp) boundaries helps one to stay truthful or to effec-
tively memorize and remember information. Chunking and semantic coding facilitate this 
and vagueness may be a necessary consequence of these mechanisms. 
However, it is not enough that the vagueness of vague terms is a necessary consequence of 
their other (actually valuable) properties for it to be valuable, too. As Hrafn Asgeirsson 
(2015, p. 426) argued, “value only ‘transmits’ from ends to means but not to necessary 
consequences of those means.” That is, while the possibility of semantic coding with the 
help of a vague and general term can be said to be valuable in virtue of being a means to 
effectively memorize and remember information, its vagueness (even though it might be 
a necessary consequence of semantic coding) cannot. The argument goes through only if 
we assume a extremely diminished sense of value because only then premise (4) can be 
upheld. 
3.5 The Argument from Metaphysics 
Something very similar can be said for another argument that might be made for the value 
of vagueness. Because the world is fuzzy and we want to correctly and adequately represent 
the world, we should use vague language. 
(1) It is desirable to correctly and adequately represent the world. 
(2) The world is fuzzy. 
(3) Vagueness is an indispensable causal means to correctly and adequately represent 
a fuzzy world. 
(4) If vagueness is an indispensable causal means to something desirable, then vague-
ness has instrumental value. 
(5) Thus: Vagueness has instrumental value. 
Premise (2) is, of course, highly controversial. But even if we would accept such an ontol-
ogy, the argument would still run into the same difficulties as the Argument from Memory 
and the Argument from Perception. There is an underlying ambiguity of “fuzzy” that 
makes the arguments invalid. The fuzziness induced by vagueness is simply not the same 
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as the (assumed) fuzziness in perception, memory, or the world. Vagueness is not con-
cerned with fuzziness in the object, but with fuzziness in the extension of the term. 
A term such as “mountain” is vague because it is susceptible to the Sorites paradox and 
there are (possible) borderline cases of mountains. The term can, however, also be used to 
fuzzily refer to things in the world. When referring to the mountain Zugspitze with the 
phrase “this mountain,” we do not care whether the mountain begins at the camp at an 
altitude of 1000 meter, at the tree line at 2000 meter or anywhere in-between. 
3.6 The Argument from Learning 
Some philosophers have hinted at the possibility that vagueness could improve the learn-
ing of language. Maybe it is easier to learn vague terms than to learn precise ones? In fact, 
children first learn vague expressions and only later more difficult precise ones such as 
number words and mathematical operators. In general, children learn expressions by ref-
erence to prototypes.17 They learn the expression "red" by reference to firetrucks, roses, 
and sunsets. They do not care about boundaries between red things and non-red things. 
Nora Kluck (2014) claims that vagueness plays the central role in the learning strategy of 
overgeneralization. Consider a child who does not yet know the correct expression for 
some object. She could either remain silent, thus giving away even the chance to be under-
stood, or, alternatively, she could overgeneralize making herself at least potentially un-
derstood. Kluck claims that vagueness facilitates overgeneralization because it allows the 
child to "freely move" within the borderline area. She can use a term that only borderline 
applies if she does not know a better term which would clearly apply. Thus, she argues, 
overgeneralization is a communicative strategy in language learning relying on the use of 
vagueness. And, this means that vagueness has a value. Let us explicate the Argument from 
Learning in this way: 
(1) Borderline cases help children to learn language due to overgeneralization. 
(2) If borderline cases help children to learn language due to overgeneralization, then 
vagueness has instrumental value. 
(3) Thus: Vagueness has instrumental value. 
Unfortunately, premise (1) is highly questionable. Children primarily overgeneralize in 
clear cases of non-application. Vagueness is neither conceptually dependent on the phe-
nomenon of overgeneralization nor empirically correlated. While overgeneralization 
might make it slightly easier for children to learn certain terms, borderline cases do not 
play any role here, since children can overgeneralize by applying expressions to cases to 
which they clearly do not apply. That's the point of overgeneralization. 
More strikingly, the value of overgeneralization is highest when the child’s audience can 
figure out that she wanted to clearly apply the expression – despite it semantically not 
clearly or even clearly not applying. Borderline cases here are least disadvantageous when 
                                                        
17 See, e.g., Rosch (1973) and Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, and Boyes-Braem (1976) 
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their main effect is mitigated; they are not disadvantageous when we can figure out that 
the term is intended to apply even though it is in fact (semantically) a borderline case. 
Hence, also the Argument from Learning fails to show that vagueness has instrumental 
value. 
3.7 The Argument from Cognitive Costs 
Maybe overgeneralization does not require vagueness, but somehow vagueness makes our 
language processing easier, doesn't it? There is reason to believe that vague messages can 
be processed more easily than precise ones and, for that reason, cause less cognitive costs. 
It is arguably easier to pronounce the term "many people" than "324,542 people." It is ar-
guably also easier to hold the thought in mind and to learn the term. Examples such as this 
one are often used in an attempt to demonstrate that vagueness is valuable because it 
makes it easier for us to use language. Let us explicate the Argument from Cognitive Costs as 
follows: 
(1) Vague language is (cognitively) easier to process than precise language. 
(2) If vague language is (cognitively) easier to process than precise language, then 
vagueness has instrumental value. 
(3) Thus: Vagueness has instrumental value. 
Premise (1) is uncontroversial: most people have a harder time to process mathematical 
equations than statements about tall people or blue books. But can we really infer from this 
that it is vagueness that makes it (cognitively) easier to process these utterances? 
It appears that we generally use language according to some form of the mini-max prin-
ciple, i.e., we are as unclear and inarticulate as possible in order not to waste energy, while 
at the same time as clear and articulate as necessary in order to still get the message across. 
Hence, the goal of avoiding unclarity has to be balanced with the goal of not wasting en-
ergy. This principle is a reformulation of the so called "false Zipf's law".18 If that is true, 
any formal proof for the value of vagueness based on cognitive costs becomes trivial. The 
agents' expected utility increases simply because costs decrease.19  
As Manfred Krifka (2009) points out, it is often beneficial for both speaker and listener to 
use descriptions of the world at a more coarse-grained degree of granularity. It is both lin-
guistically and cognitively easier to process the utterances in  
(E1) “Anna is tall.” 
and 
(E2) “Anna has a height of 190cm.” 
than the utterance in 
(E3) “Anna has a height of 191.02cm.” 
                                                        
18 It is not to be confused with Zipf's law in mathematical statistics. Cf. Zipf (1949) 
19 In the classical model by Spence (1974), sending a message is costly by itself and one could increase the costs 
for precise messages by stipulation. 
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Cognitive costs seem to rise with degree of granularity. A coarse-grained degree of granu-
larity allows for loose interpretation even of precise terms. In general, the more fine-
grained the degree of granularity, the less pragmatically vague the utterance can be inter-
preted. If the speaker uses several decimal places, there is no room for the hearer to inter-
pret her utterance loosely. The reason is the conversational Maxim of Quantity: the speaker 
would not have added the information if it were not required. 
Conversely, the lack of decimal places indicates (in combination with other factors) that a 
few minutes more or less do not matter. This allows for pragmatic vagueness. However, 
the use of less precise terms and loose interpretation do not imply that it is the vagueness 
of the less precise terms that accounts for less cognitive costs when processing them. An 
imprecise term such as “tall” is not only vague, but also general, i.e., “tall” has a larger 
extension than “a height of 191.02cm.” A more coarse-grained degree of granularity allows 
thus for more generality – a property of language which clearly does make information 
processing easier (and also helps, as we noted, to adequately represent our inexact percep-
tual experiences and memories). 
While it might be both informationally and economically best to use a vague term, its 
vagueness does not become actual in most situations. Importantly, any gains in processing 
vague terms are lost when actually confronted with borderline cases. Then we have to think 
twice about what could have been meant by the  vague utterance. That is why vague terms 
are usually not used when confronted with borderline cases; it would hinder the purposes 
of communication. Rather, they are used to apply to clear cases.  It might thus be the case 
that the costs of using precise terms outweigh the expected costs of vague ones because the 
likelihood of actually encountering borderline cases is negligible. The risk of running into 
borderline cases is merely tacitly assumed. 
Moreover, it is not even entirely clear whether vagueness reduces cognitive costs even in 
clear cases. The experiments by Matthew J. Green and van Deemter (2011, p. 5) do, accord-
ing to the authors' own conclusion, "more to cast doubt on the cost reduction hypothesis 
than to confirm it." They think that other linguistic properties of vague terms are actually 
effective in reducing the cognitive costs. Consider again replacing the term "many" with 
the expression "more than 1,000" when reacting to van Deemter's earthquake scenario. 
What is done by replacing "324,542 people" with "more than 1,000" is pruning away de-
tails – which may not be available anymore (due to a fading memory) or which may simply 
be irrelevant. The same effect is present when going from "324,542 people" to "many." 
The vague term "many" is not only more general than the precise "324,542 people,” it is 
also shorter, grammatically less complex, and devoid of mathematical concepts. These 
properties alone explain why "many" is cognitively less costly than "324,542 people." 
While it arguably is cost-efficient to use vague terms, it is doubtful that their vagueness is 
the reason for it. A reduction in cognitive costs with vague terms cannot show that vague-
ness is valuable, i.e., that borderline cases, Sorites susceptibility, or the lack of (sharp) 
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boundaries are effective. Again, it seems that vagueness is only a side-effect of other actu-
ally valuable – in this case, cognitive cost reducing – properties of the vague terms. That 
is why premise (2) is not warranted – at least not without further evidence. 
3.8 The Argument from Measurement 
It is (surprisingly often) argued that vagueness is valuable because precision is inefficient. 
In particular, it is said that the use of precise terms requires unnecessary and inefficient 
measurement.20 Vagueness, in contrast, makes ordinary language expressions fit for eve-
ryday use. Without vagueness we would have to measure all day long the number of grains, 
the height of people, and the wavelength of light when all we want is to talk about heaps, 
tall people, and blue books. The argument can be reconstructed as follows: 
(1) The use of precise language requires unnecessary and inefficient measurement. 
(2) If the use of vague language prevents unnecessary and inefficient measurement, 
then vagueness has instrumental value. 
(3) Thus: Vagueness has instrumental value. 
Let us assume for the sake of the argument that premise (2) be true and let us focus on 
premise (1). It certainly would be inefficient to measure the number of grains each time we 
want to determine whether some arrangement of grains is a heap. But does the use of pre-
cise language really require measurement? 
It does not. It is perfectly conceivable to have a completely precise language without the 
need of any additional measurement. The basic tenet of the epistemic theory of vagueness 
is that ordinary language expressions have precise boundaries that cannot be known. A lot 
may be said against this theory, but it is not inconsistent in and by itself. The replacement 
of the vague term “blue” with “blue*” whose extension is determined by a precise range 
in the wave length spectrum would not require any new measurements. Most of the time 
we use language such that it clearly applies. For that reason, no measurement is necessary 
because we don't come even close to the vicinity of the sharp boundary. Hence, we can most 
of time use the precise term “blue*” just as we use our ordinary language expression 
“blue.” 
On one hand, it is correct that measurement is necessary if the case at hand is close to the 
sharp boundary of a precise term and we want to be certain about its application to it. On 
the other, if the case is close to the fuzzy boundary of a vague term, we are necessarily ig-
norant about its application. Both precision and vagueness thus result in ignorance if we 
are close to the boundary of the term’s extension. But precision has the additional ad-
vantage that ignorance can be resolved by measurement. Precision does not require meas-
urement but makes it possible. Thus, premise (1) has to be rejected. 
Gottlob Frege’s analogy of the hand is sometimes cited as support for a variant of the Argu-
ment from Measurement: 
                                                        
20 See, for instance, Kluck (2014). See also the Arguments from Perception, Memory and Cognitive Costs. 
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The [...] shortcomings result from a certain softness and changeability of language 
which [..] is a precondition of its viability and versatility. In this respect, language can 
be compared to the hand which, despite its ability to adapt itself to most diverse 
tasks, does not suffice. We created artificial hands, tools for special purposes which 
work in such precision in which the hand could not. And by what is this precision fa-
cilitated? Exactly by the rigidness, the parts' unchangeability, the lack of which makes 
the hand so versatilely skilled.21 
Natural language is "soft“ and “changeable.“ It is multi-functional just like the human 
hand. In contrast, tools such as screwdrivers are rigid. They can only be used for particular 
purposes – and the same is true for the tools of formal logic. The precision of screwdrivers 
and formal logic is facilitated by their rigidity. Supposedly, the multi-functionality of nat-
ural language is based on its vagueness, since it is precision that makes formal logic so 
useful for its purpose. However, this is a non-sequitur. Let me show why. 
Frege’s analogy – understood in this way – can be reconstructed as the following argu-
ment: 
(4) Formal languages are useful because of their precision. 
(5) If formal languages are useful because of their precision, natural language must be 
useful because of its lack of precision. 
(6) Thus: Natural language is useful because of its vagueness. 
Frege’s analogy does not aim at the vagueness of natural language and it is hard to see how 
Frege himself could have understood it in this way. His analogy applies to other properties 
of natural language, which happens to contain lots of vague terms. Natural language is cer-
tainly multi-functional due to its generality, polysemy, and various pragmatic features. 
We can use the same terms for different purposes because they are polysemous. We can use 
the same terms to express different contents because we make implicature and implici-
tures. We use metaphors and irony to convey virtually any imaginable content with the 
same limited number of symbols. Has vagueness anything to do with this? It is at least 
highly doubtful that Frege thought it did. 
Frege was right to claim that the exactness of formal languages stems from their precision. 
Premise (4) is arguably correct. Also, premise (5) seems to be warranted. Frege’s analogy 
suggests that formal and natural languages have complementary functions. Formal lan-
guage is useful because it is precise. Natural language is useful because it is multi-func-
tional. However, there is no explanatory link between the effects of precision in formal 
languages and the effects of vagueness in natural language. Lack of precision does entail 
much more than vagueness. It certainly does not entail that the adaptability and efficiency 
                                                        
21 Translated from Frege (1882, p. 52): "Die [...] Mängel haben ihren Grund in einer gewissen Weichheit und Ver-
änderlichkeit der Sprache, die [...] Bedingung ihrer Entwicklungsfähigkeit und vielseitigen Tauglichkeit ist. Die 
Sprache kann in dieser Hinsicht mit der Hand verglichen werden, die uns trotz ihrer Fähigkeit, sich den ver-
schiedensten Aufgaben anzupassen, nicht genügt. Wir schaffen uns künstliche Hände, Werkzeuge für besondere 
Zwecke, die so genau arbeiten, wie die Hand es nicht vermöchte. Und wodurch wird diese Genauigkeit möglich? 
Durch eben die Starrheit, die Unveränderlichkeit der Teile, deren Mangel die Hand so vielseitig geschickt macht." 
What is the Value of Vagueness? 
 
18 
of natural language stems from borderline cases, Sorites susceptibility, or the lack of 
(sharp) boundaries.22 To draw the conclusion (6), an additional premise is needed. We 
would need the premise that the usefulness of imprecision entails the usefulness of vague-
ness -  a premise that is untenable. 
3.9 The Argument from Adaptability 
A common argument for the value of vagueness is that it makes language more adaptable. 
In particular, it has been argued that the gradual widening of a term's extension along a 
Sorites series over time and by a significant group of speakers can facilitate a change in 
meaning that satisfies the communicative needs of a language community. We can refor-
mulate it in the following way: 
(1) Sorites susceptibility makes language more adaptable. 
(2) If Sorites susceptibility makes language more adaptable, then vagueness has in-
strumental value. 
(3) Thus: Vagueness has instrumental value. 
Renate Bartsch seems at first glance to support the Argument from Language Change: 
Semantic norms carry the possibility of change with them. Because of this, we can 
adjust our language to change in our physical and social world. If vagueness and 
context-dependence of meanings were not part of the meanings of words, language 
would be a less efficient means of communication [...]. (Bartsch, 1984, p. 372) 
Bartsch claims that vagueness and context-dependence of meaning make language more 
efficient by facilitating semantic change. Gradual change in meaning allows us to adjust 
our language efficiently to a changing world. Kluck (2014) argues, based on Bartsch's 
claim, that vagueness facilitates adaptability of language. She considers the gradual 
changes underlying the Sorites susceptibility of vague terms as evidence for premise (1). 
Indeed, meaning does change gradually and this is the reason why we can create Sorites 
series from an old meaning to a new one. But does this entail that it is the Sorites suscep-
tibility which facilitates the change? 
On closer examination, also the Argument from Language Change fails. Bartsch actually at-
tributes the possibility of change to polysemy and other forms of context-relativity, ex-
plicitly denying any role of vagueness in the philosophical sense: 
Vagueness due to gradualness does, to my knowledge, not play a role in semantic 
change, while vagueness due to contextual indeterminateness of a relative term can 
give rise to metonymic relationships in the structure of meaning [...]. (Bartsch, 1984, 
p. 374) 
                                                        
22 While it is true that vagueness correlates with context-sensitivity and precision correlates with context-insen-
sitivity, there is no necessary connection. It is conceivable, as Åkerman and Greenough (2010) show, that vague 
terms are completely context-insensitive and equally conceivable that precise terms are context-sensitive. Think 
for example of interpretations of adjectives such as “tall” within formal semantics. The adjective “tall” is per-
fectly precise in this framework, but it is still context-sensitive because it is relative to some (precise) standard. 
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While it could still be possible that vagueness plays some role, other properties of language 
are clearly efficient to facilitate long-term adaptability – as, for instance, the figurative 
use of words and their context-relativity. We can metaphorically use a term consistently 
in the same way until its metaphorical meaning becomes part of the lexical meaning of the 
then polysemous term. 
As long as it cannot be shown how vagueness (and, in particular, Sorites susceptibility) can 
help to achieve anything like this, premise (1) is unwarranted. There is thus no positive 
argument for the claim that Sorites susceptibility or the lack of (sharp) boundaries allow 
for gradual change in meaning. Hence, neither Sorites susceptibility nor the lack of (sharp) 
boundaries entail that vagueness plays an interesting role in facilitating language change. 
4 Preliminary Conclusions 
There is a fundamental problem that inheres in most arguments for the value of vagueness. 
Vague terms always have several properties besides their vagueness. The problem is that 
in virtually all cases these properties clearly are better candidates for suitable means to 
desirable ends than vagueness, while there is no evidence that vagueness (in any viable 
sense) is suitable to produce the desired effects. 
First, experiments by Matthew Green and Kees van Deemter indicate that it is not the 
vagueness of a vague term which makes it easier to process than a co-referring precise one. 
Instead, “the observed benefits may be due to factors other than vagueness itself that the 
vague forms bring along with them: factors like avoiding numbers and permitting com-
parison tasks.”23 Mathematical terms are more difficult for many of us to process, while 
the standard-relativity of vague terms allows for flexible and context-sensitive applica-
tion. 
Second, other forms of indeterminacy are systematically confused with vagueness. Con-
sider the term “many” again. As pointed out above, it is not only vague but also more gen-
eral than the original “324,542.” Moreover, it is relative to a contextually valued standard 
and can thus vary in its extension in a way “324,542” or “more than 1,000” cannot. Nor do 
these precise expressions lean themselves towards figurative or other pragmatic uses as 
do terms such as “many.” 
Furthermore, if a speaker says that the number of perished people is “many,” she might 
not only say something about the earthquake but give also a value judgment. She provides 
information about her values and assessment of the state of affairs.24 As Frank Veltman put 
it, the speaker adds an opinion.25 She can pragmatically imply that the number is high rel-
ative to other contexts that she considers comparable. The audience can learn something 
                                                        
23 See Green and van Deemter (2013, p. 5). Cf. also Kennedy (2011) for the relation between vagueness and com-
parisons. 
24 Jucker, Smith, and Lüdge (2003) show, for instance, that imprecise speech acts better convey the speaker's 
attitude and inform also about her assumptions about the audience's beliefs in addition to what is said. 
25 This is discussed by van Deemter(2010, pp. 266–267) and Rooij (2011, pp. 129–130). Both refer to an inaugural 
lecture by Veltman (2002). 
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about the speaker herself from her uttering “many” – something it could not learn from 
her uttering “more than 1,000” and “324,542.” 
For some reason, it seems to be particularly difficult to keep vagueness and standard-rel-
ativity apart. Even van Deemter, who writes on the value of vagueness with matchless ac-
curateness, seems to oscillate between both phenomena. He is quite explicit about his in-
tention to talk about vague terms in the philosophical sense that they “allow borderline 
cases.”26 Nevertheless, he asks then the following questions: 
(Q1) “Why do people make such frequent use of words whose meaning is difficult to 
pin down?” 
(Q2) “What do these words mean?” 
(Q3) “Why is it that their meaning varies so much from one context to the next?” 
The first two questions seem to point to polysemy or multi-dimensionality, while the third 
aims toward standard-relativity or context-sensitivity more generally. He describes 
vagueness and context-sensitivity as two sides of the same coin. Van Deemter argues that 
terms such as “indecent” or “vehicle” are vague “because context affects the interpreta-
tion of these words in ways that are impossible to foresee: their precisification depends on 
who is it that does the precisifying”.27 
Context, of course, affects the interpretation of vague words. But what does it have to do 
with borderline cases, Sorites susceptibility, or the lack of (sharp) boundaries? Surely, 
vague terms can be precisified differently by different persons in different contexts. But 
before they can precisify them, they need to determine a context of application. This re-
quires them to settle on a particular sense of “indecent,” “tall,” “blue,” or “many.” The 
impossibility to foresee in which ways context affects the interpretation of these terms 
stems from their property of being context-sensitive – not from their vagueness. 
5 The Argument from Strategic Fallacy 
If we do allow for something to have value if it is a suitable means to an end that is desirable 
for someone, then another argument can be made. There may be somewhat sinister func-
tions for vagueness that have so far been overlooked in the literature entirely. It is possible 
that someone exploits the vagueness of vague terms in slippery slope arguments to make 
other people believe or do something that she desires. The argument is the following: 
(1) Someone desires to make other people 𝜑. 
(2) Making a slippery slope argument by exploiting the Sorites susceptibility of vague 
terms is a suitable causal means to make other people 𝜑. 
(3) If making a slippery slope argument by exploiting the Sorites susceptibility of vague 
terms is a suitable causal means to bring about what someone desires, then vague-
ness has instrumental value. 
                                                        
26 See van Deemter (2010, p. 2) 
27 See van Deemter (2010, p. 269) 
What is the Value of Vagueness? 
 
21 
(4) Thus: Vagueness has instrumental value. 
This, now, is a function that clearly relies on the Sorites susceptibility of vague terms. 
Premise (1) is evidently unproblematic. Premise (2) may require an example to be war-
ranted. But it is easy to produce one: Just consider the argumentation by many opponents 
to what they call “political correctness”. They argue that if we were to restrict the freedom 
of speech, there will soon be a “tyranny of political correctness”, which will prohibit even 
the most innocent expressions of opinion. By doing so, they try to make other people stop 
criticizing them by exploiting the Sorites susceptibility of the vague term “restriction to 
freedom of speech”. Does a criticism restrict the freedom of speech? Does a taboo? A moral 
rule with strict social sanctions? A legal provision? Indeed, a Sorites series with a corre-
sponding slippery slope argument can easily be constructed– and often in public debate 
such argumentations do have the desired effect. 
Finally, while premise (3) requires little from the concept of instrumental value, is not at 
all absurd - in contrast to the senses of “value” that were required to make some of the 
other arguments work. Here, we need not assume that vagueness has instrumental value 
simply due to its being an unavoidable side-effect of something desirable. The vagueness 
of the term has instrumental value for the speaker because it helps to further her goal of 
manipulating other people. This may be morally reprehensible, and certainly it is not a 
value in any objective sense. Thus, while this may not be the function people have in mind 
when claiming that vagueness is valuable, I take this to be the only “value” of vagueness 
that has (so far) been clearly shown. 
6 Summary 
Unfortunately, the discussion of the arguments for the view that vagueness is valuable has 
not yielded very promising results. Most arguments fail because either they only show that 
vagueness is not necessarily bad or that it is simply unavoidable or that some feature of 
vague language other than its vagueness has a value. Only the last argument for the value 
of vagueness as exploiting the Sorites susceptibility in slippery slope arguments appears 
conclusive. While there seems to be some value of vagueness in the sense that it can stra-
tegically be exploited, it proved to be much harder to show some more objective value of 
vagueness. If we are interested in value in this stronger sense, we should better refrain 
from talking about “the value of vagueness” – given that at the moment we do not have a 
sufficiently good grasp of what such a value of vagueness could be. 
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